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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vY 
STEVEN L. GRIFFIN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 870108-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
The Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts are set 
forth previously in Appellant's Brief (Brief of Appellant at 1-12). 
Mr. Griffin takes this opportunity to reply to a portion of 
Respondent's Brief. Issues to which Mr. Griffin does not reply are 
adequately covered in Appellant's opening brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should review the admissibility of Steven 
Griffin's confessions. Mr. Griffin filed a motion to suppress both 
confessions and an evidentiary hearing on that motion was held 
before the trial judge. When the state attempted to introduce a 
tape of the second confession, Mr. Griffin objected to the form of 
the tape and later stipulated to the form without withdrawing his 
objection to the admissibility. This stipulation as to the form of 
the tape and transcript should not preclude appellate review of the 
admissibility of the confessions. 
Mr. Griffin effectively invoked his right to counsel when 
he stated "I'm calling an attorney." This statement was an 
unequivocal request which required that the officer cease 
questioning. Even if the statement were considered equivocal, the 
following question and response did not clarify that request and the 
officer should not have resumed interrogation. 
Admission of a confession which is coerced or taken in 
violation of the right to counsel is not harmless error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE ADMISSIBILITY 
OF MR. GRIFFIN'S CONFESSIONS. 
(Reply to Point I of Respondent's Brief) 
A. MR. GRIFFIN PRESERVED HIS OBJECTION TO THE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CONFESSIONS. 
Mr. Griffin moved to suppress both the February 15, 1986 
"sarcastic" confession made in the police car and the February 17, 
1986 confession made at the jail (R. 160-61). At trial, Mr. Griffin 
did not renew his objection to the February 15 statement, nor did 
defense counsel object to testimony regarding the February 17 
confession. Defense counsel did object when the state attempted to 
play the tape of the February 17 confession (R. 419). 
In State v. Johnson, No. 20814, slip op., (Utah 1987) 
(filed December 31, 1987), the Utah Supreme Court held that a 
defendant is not required "to object or renew his motion to suppress 
at the trial where the trial judge is also the judge who ruled on 
the pretrial motion and where the record or transcript indicates 
that an evidentiary hearing was held." Id., slip opinion at 3. 
- 2 -
In the present case, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Third 
District Court, presided over the evidentiary hearing on the motion 
to suppress the confessions and the trial. Hence, an objection to 
the admissibility of the confessions at trial was not necessary. 
In light of the decision in State v. Johnson, the state's 
reliance on State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983) and State v. 
Holyoak, 67 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (Ct. App. 1987) is misplaced. 
B. REVIEW OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF FEBRUARY 17 
CONFESSION SHOULD NOT BE PRECLUDED BY DEFENSE 
COUNSEL'S STIPULATION TO THE FORM IN WHICH 
THE TAPE AND TRANSCRIPT WERE ADMITTED. 
When the state attempted to introduce the tape of the 
February 17 confession, defense counsel objected (R. 419). An off 
the record discussion at the side bar followed (R. 419). The Court 
then stated on the record "(T)here has been an offer of the exhibit 
and the court will rule, I'll hold and reserve receiving that 
exhibit right now and allow counsel to work out something during the 
lunch hour on that particular exhibit" (R. 419-20). After a recess 
and further testimony, the court asked " . . . Exhibit 3 is the 
discussion between the detective and the defendant at the jail and 
may be stipulated, Exhibit 3 may be received?" (R. 434). Defense 
counsel responded affirmatively (R. 434). 
The state acknowledges that the version of the interview 
presented to the jury was edited and speculates1 that defense 
1
 Respondent acknowledges in its brief at 20 that this line of 
argument is speculation. See Respondent's Brief at 20. 
- 3 -
counsel changed his mind and stipulated to the edited version as a 
tactical decision aimed at minimizing the ultimate impact by 
convincing the jury to convict Mr. Griffin only "of the offenses to 
which defendant confessed." Respondent's Brief at 20. However, a 
review of the proceedings as a whole shows that defense counsel 
continued to object to the constitutionality of the February 17 
confession. The Motion to Suppress, the hearing thereon and defense 
counsel's unrelinquishing examination of witnesses at trial in an 
effort to point out both the involuntary nature of the confession 
and the denial of Mr. Griffin's right to counsel (R. 436-40, 446-73, 
513-14, 518-19, 591-93, 602-23) show that counsel did not change his 
mind and choose to waive the constitutional argument as a tactical 
decision .2 
A review of the entire record shows that defense counsel 
stipulated only to the form in which the jail interview was 
admitted, not to the voluntariness of the confession nor the denial 
of Mr. Griffin's right to counsel nor to the truth of the statements 
contained in the tape.3 such a stipulation as to the form of 
2
 The State suggests that additional evidence of intercourse or 
sodomy was edited before the tape of the jail interview was 
presented to the jury. However, such speculation is not supported 
by the record. Furthermore, Mr. Griffin stated in the version 
presented to the jury that penetration occurred "may be slightly" 
(R. 418, 616). Slight penetration is sufficient to sustain a 
conviction for rape of a child. Hence the State's argument does not 
fit the facts of this case. 
3 The tape of the first interview involves discussions regarding 
other possible victims. Although the record is sketchy on this 
point, the second tape also contained discussion of activity with 
other persons which needed to be deleted before presenting the tape 
to the jury. 
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evidence "is different from a stipulation of what the facts are." 
State v. Scandrett, 468 P.2d 639, 640 (Utah 1970). The State's 
reasoning could also be used to argue that based on the 
"stipulation", Mr. Griffin agreed that the statements contained in 
the jail interview were true. However, the record read as a whole 
shows that Mr. Griffin continued to assert his innocence and 
challenge the admissibility of the confessions. 
In claiming that review of the admissibility issue is 
precluded by Mr. Griffin's limited stipulation to an edited version 
of the tape recording and transcript of the confession, the State 
relies exclusively on State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1987). 
However, Medina is neither persuasive nor controlling. The decision 
in State v. Medina, supra, is based on Rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. Such rule is inapplicable in the present 
case. In asking the Court to rely on the Medina decision, the State 
is asking this court to ignore the crucial distinction between 
evidence received in violation of a constitutional protection and 
the giving of jury instructions. 
The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed a 
longstanding judgment "that some constitutional errors require 
reversal without regard to the evidence in the particular case" 
because they "render a trial fundamentally unfair". Rose v. Clark, 
478 U.S. , 106 S.Ct. , 92 L.Ed. 2d 460, 470 (1986). Some 
constitutional errors "are so fundamental and pervasive that they 
require reversal without regard to the facts or circumstances of the 
particular case." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. , 106 
S.Ct. , 89 L.Ed.2d 674, 685 (1986). Two such constitutional 
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errors are the admission of a coerced confession and the denial of 
the right to counsel. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 
87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) citing Payne v. Arkansas, 356 
U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958); Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct.792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). 
The highest court further explained: 
[0]ur harmless error cases do not turn on whether 
the defendant conceded the factual issue on which 
the error bore. Rather, we have held that tfChapman 
[v. California] mandates consideration of the 
conviction for constitutional errors that may be 
harmless." 
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. _ _ , 106 S.Ct. , 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 474 
(1986), citing United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509, n. 7, 
103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96, 106, n. 7 (1983)(emphasis added). 
Mr. Griffin assigns error to the admission of the confessions on the 
grounds that they were involuntary because coerced and that they 
were taken in violation of his right to counsel. (Brief of 
Appellant at 13). Review of such constitutional error does not turn 
on whether "the defendant conceded the factual issue on which the 
error bore." Rose v. Clark at 474. 
The Utah Supreme Court stressed in both State v. Lesley, 
672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983) and State v. Johnson, No. 20814 (Utah 1987) 
(filed December 31, 1987) that the crucial factor is whether the 
judge was aware of the objection and had an opportunity to consider 
the admissibility issue. A review of this case as a whole shows 
that the trial judge was aware of the objection and had a chance to 
consider the admissibility of the confessions. In Johnson, the 
evidence was challenged based on a Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure argument. Search and seizure issues unlike coerced 
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confessions and right to counsel issues have not been singled out as 
the type of constitutional error fundamental to a fair trial in a 
criminal proceeding. 
In the present case where the same judge presided over 
the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress and the trial and 
defense counsel challenged the confessions through cross and direct 
examination of witnesses throughout the trial, defense counsel's 
limited stipulation to the form in which the confession was admitted 
should not preclude appellate review. 
However, in the event this Court is persuaded by the 
State's argument that the stipulation as to the form in which the 
evidence was admitted precludes appellate review, Mr. Griffin would 
request that the matter be remanded to district court for a hearing 
to determine the contents of the discussion at the bench regarding 
the editing of the tape, and whether the trial judge believed that 
counsel's objection to the admission of the confession on the 
grounds of coercion and denial of right to counsel continued despite 
the limited stipulation to the form in which the evidence was 
presented. 
C. MR. GRIFFIN OBJECTED TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF 
BOTH STATEMENTS. 
Two interviews of Mr. Griffin occurred in this case: one 
on February 15, 1986 in the police car and one on February 17, 1986 
in the jail. At the motion to suppress, defense counsel stated in 
his opening statement "I come before the Court on a motion to 
suppress Mr. Griffin's confessions" (R. 160). Despite an 
- 7 
interruption by the state, defense counsel stated at the close of 
his opening argument: 
"And those are the grounds for our motion, one that 
he was effectively deprived of his right to counsel 
. . . (a)nd that the confession was coerced, 
therefore, not voluntary." 
The reporter did not transcribe the closing argument in the motion 
hearing. However, Steve Griffinfs claim is set forth in the opening 
argument. Any statement made following the request for counsel is 
objected to on the grounds that Mr. Griffin's right to counsel was 
violated, in addition, Mr. Griffin objected to both the sarcastic 
confession given on February 15 and the confession at the jail on 
February 17, on the grounds that they were coerced. 
As the state points out, the second confession was the 
more damaging since it was more specific than the first, and the 
officers acknowledged that the first was sarcastic, insincere and 
invalid. On February 15th, the coercion in the interview caused Mr. 
Griffin to give a statement which the officers acknowledged was not 
a true confession. Where interview tactics lead to such a sarcastic 
confession, coercion is implicit in those tactics. 
While much of the coercion occurred during the first 
interview,4* the effect of such coercion was cumulative. A request 
for an attorney which was ignored, followed by repetitive comments 
regarding Mr. Griffin's need for counseling and the necessity of 
confession in order to get treatment and stay with his family, 
4
 In footnote 12 of its brief at 27-28, the State states "defendant 
deceptively cites to this court statements made during the first 
interview which were by defendant's choice not before the trial 
court at the suppression hearing." At the suppression hearing, the 
following discussion occurred: 
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followed by two days without contact outside the jail and no 
attorney followed by more coercive comments pressured Mr. 
Griffin into making the February 17 statements. Hence, Mr. 
Griffin has objected throughout to the admissibility of both 
confessions, arguing that they were coerced and denied him his 
right to counsel. 
4 cont.
 T H E COURT: Would the tape be the best evidence then? 
MR. GARCIA: I suppose it would. . . . 
• • • 
THE COURT: Well,let me get down to the nub of it. The 
tape would be the answer wouldn't it? 
MS. BEARSON: It would certainly be the best evidence. 
THE COURT: Let's find out. 
MR. GARCIA: Ask that the tape be played then 
(R. 165) 
The foregoing shows, contrary to the state's assertion, that defense 
counsel did not choose to keep the tape from the Court and in fact 
asked that it be played at the hearing. 
In addition, the State asked that the entire tape be 
played (R. 165). Furthermore, the Court received no objections to 
its question "Any objections to admitting the tape as the evidence 
of the conversation?" (R. 165). See Addendum A for complete 
transcript of discussion regarding admission of the first tape. 
Hence, it appears that the tape was admitted into evidence. 
The portion of the tape which was played at the hearing 
was not transcribed (R. 166). The tape began at "This is a lie. 
I'm calling an attorney" and, as the state agrees, it is unclear at 
what point the tape was turned off. Trial counsel for Mr. Griffin 
believed that the remainder of the tape was played and in preparing 
the modification, the appellate attorney read the transcript as 
admitting the entire tape. In an effort to avoid any problem or 
wasteful argument, a representative of the Legal Defender 
Association's office met with a representative of the Attorney 
General to go over the tape recording word by word in order to 
ensure accuracy in the transcription. See Addendum B. After 
defense counsel made every and any change requested by the Attorney 
General's office, the State stipulated to the inclusion of such tape 
and transcription in the record. See Addendum C. Only after the 
foregoing review and stipulation did defense counsel file its Motion 
to Modify Record on Appeal. See Addendum D. 
Defense counsel has provided this Court with a copy of 
the tape in the event that the Court should elect to listen and 
decide which portion of said tape is appropriate for consideration 
in this appeal. However, defense counsel had no intent to deceive 
or mislead and simply placed the the tape and transcription into 
evidence to complete the record. 
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POINT II. MR, GRIFFIN EFFECTIVELY INVOKED HIS 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
Although State argues that Mr, Griffin's assertion, "I'm 
calling an attorney" is not a clear request for the present 
assistance of counsel (Resp. Brief at 23), neither Miranda nor any 
of its progeny support this claim. In Edwards v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 885 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States 
Supreme Court did not find such an ambiguity in the statement, "I 
want an attorney before making a deal" which arguably implies future 
intent much more so than Mr. Griffin's statement. 451 U.S. 477, 
478, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (1981), rehearing denied, 69 
L.Ed.2d 984, 101 S.Ct. 3128. In fact, in Smith v. Illinois which 
was cited by the State, the defendant's reply, "Uh, yea. I'd like 
to do that," to the question of whether he understood his right to 
have a lawyer present during questioning was interpreted as an 
unequivocal request for counsel. 469 U.S. at 93. The State, 
therefore, asks this Court to find an ambiguity where the United 
States Supreme Court has declined to do so. 
After asserting that the statement "I'm calling an 
attorney" was ambiguous, the State claims that Detective Strong's 
next question and Mr. Griffin's answer clarified that ambiguity 
(Resp. Brief at 24-25). Detective Strong asked "[A]re ya saying you 
don't want to talk anymore?" See Addendum B to Appellant's Opening 
Brief at 1. Mr. Griffin replied, "No, I ain't saying that, I'm just 
saying it's a lie, I am going to talk to an attorney." Addendum B 
to Appellant's Brief at 1. 
Even if Mr. Griffin's initial request were ambiguous as 
to when he intended to call an attorney, his subsequent statement 
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did not clear up that ambiguity and in fact, suggested again his 
desire to consult with an attorney. 
The State's position is unconvincing. According to the 
state, the statement, "I am going to talk to an attorney "is 
considered an unambiguous limited request for counsel only in the 
future, while the statement, "I'm calling an attorney" is considered 
an ambiguous request. Such a distinction in intent and clarity 
offends both common sense and precedent. The courts have recognized 
a limited request for counsel when a defendant requests to speak 
with a probation officer, Fare v.Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 
2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197, rehearing denied 100 S.Ct. 186, 62 L.Ed.2d 121 
(1979), or when a defendant requests to speak with one specific 
attorney, Griffin v. Lynaugh, 823 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1987), but has 
never recognized a definite limited request only for counsel in the 
future from any statement even remotely similar to Mr. Griffin's. 
If Mr. Griffin's initial request for counsel is considered by this 
Court to be ambiguous, such ambiguity was not clarified by Detective 
Strong's next question nor Mr. Griffin's response. Detective Strong 
violated Mr. Griffin's right to counsel by continuing with the 
interrogation without clarifying the request for counsel. 
In its brief the state fails to address the admissibility 
of the jail confession based on the request for counsel during the 
February 15 interview in the police car. In footnote 11, the state 
argues "that defendant also failed to invoke his right to counsel 
during the second interview." Footnote 11, Respondent's brief at 
25-26. In making such a statement, the state misapprehends the 
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applicable law. After the initial, unclarified request, Mr. Griffin 
was not required to reinvoke his right to counsel in order to 
preserve that right. Nor did he withdraw the invocation of that 
right when, according to Detective Strong, he was readvised of his 
Miranda rights and expressed willingness to talk. 
[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have 
counsel present during custodial interrogation, a 
valid waiver of that right cannot be established by 
showing only that he responded to further 
police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he 
has been advised of his rights. . . . [A]n accused, 
such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal 
with the police only through counsel, is not subject 
to further interrogation by the authorities until 
counsel has been made available to him, unless the 
accused himself initiates further communication, 
exchanges, or conversations with the police. 
State v. Newton, 682 P.2d 295, 297 (Utah 1984), quoting Edwards, 451 
U.S. at 484-485. Like the defendant in Edwards, Mr. Griffin did not 
validly waive the right he had validly exercised two days prior. 
The State does not argue that Mr. Griffin initiated the conversation 
at the jail on February 17, 1986. Neither does the State claim that 
Mr. Griffin knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel 
at that time. The State argues solely that Mr. Griffin did not 
invoke his right to counsel on February 17, 1986, failing to address 
the pivotal question of whether Mr. Griffin's invocation two days 
prior had been waived or honored. 
Mr. Griffin effectively invoked his right to counsel on 
February 15, 1986, with the statement, "I'm calling an attorney." 
See Addendum B to Appellant's opening brief at 1. Having thus 
invoked his right, and any unlikely ambiguity remaining unclarified, 
the State was required to show that Mr. Griffin initiated further 
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communication, waived his right knowingly and intelligently, and 
spoke voluntarily for the confession at issue to be admissible. 
State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1986). Because the State 
made no such showing, the trial court erred in admitting the 
confession. 
POINT III. THE ADMISSION OF MR. GRIFFIN'S 
CONFESSIONS CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
(Reply to Respondent's Point II). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that there is a 
presumption that constitutional error is prejudicial, "but that it 
can be overcome when the court is convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that it had no such prejudicial effect upon the proceedings." 
State v. Scandrett, 468 P.2d 639, 643 (Utah 1970). In Chapman v. 
California, supra at 23, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
In fashioning a harmless-constitutional- error rule, 
we must recognize that harmless-error rules can work 
very unfair and mischievous results when, for 
example, highly important and persuasive evidence, 
or argument, though legally forbidden finds its way 
into a trial in which a question of guilt or 
innocence is a close one." 
The Chapman Court cited with approval its statement in 
Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86, 87, 845 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 
171, 173 (1963) that "the question is whether there is a reasonable 
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed 
to the conviction" and acknowledged that the state has the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a federal constitutional 
error is harmless before the appellate court can embrace such a 
finding. Id. at 24. 
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As discussed above under Point I of this Reply Brief at 
5-6/ the United States Supreme Court has held that some kinds of 
constitutional error can never be harmlessf two of which are present 
in the instant case: admission of a coerced confession and the 
denial of the right to counsel. 
Even lacking these exceptions to the harmless error 
doctrine/ it is difficult to imagine a piece of evidence which would 
contribute more to the jury's decision or have a greater impact on 
the outcome of a trial than a confession by the accused that he 
committed the crime. Arguablyf a confession would erase any 
reasonable doubt the jury might have as to a defendant's guilt. Mr. 
Griffin's confessions were not harmless since it is probable that 
they contributed to the jury's decision/ and it is likely that in 
absence of such evidence, the jury would have reached a different 
verdict. This likelihood is demonstrated with chilling emphasis in 
the words of a juror in response to the jury poll as to whether the 
guilty verdict reflected her decision, "Oh/ I'm just having a really 
hard time how I feel. Uh—yesf I guess." (R. 702). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellant/ Steven L. 
Griffin/ requests that this Court reverse his conviction for Sexual 
Abuse of a Child and remand the case to the district court with an 
order that both confessions be suppressed, and for a new trial or 
dismissal of the charges. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^JQ day of January, 1988 
^ 
[NN! 
^-r^z—ir^i 
MAtf Y GARCIA 
Attorney for Appellant 
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the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114 this day of January, 1988. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED by this day of 
January, 1988. 
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ADDENDUM A 
questions in a leading fashion by stating the answer and 
then asking if that isn't true. That's leading. The 
objection is sustained. Let's get to the nubbin of this. 
Was there a tape at the time of the conversation? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Have you listened to that tape, 
Mr. Garcia? 
MR. GARCIA: Yes. I have. 
THE COURT: And does he request an attorney on 
that tape? 
MR. GARCIA: Yes. He does. 
Q (By Mr. Garcia) Did he request an attorney? 
A Not that I recall, no. 
THE COURT: WDuld the tape be the best evidence 
then? 
MR. GARCIA: I suppose it would. You're denying 
that he says I want to talk to an attorney? 
THE WITNESS: I don't recall that. I certainly 
would have stopped questioning had he. 
Q (By Mr. Garcia) Isn't it true, you didn't stop 
the questioning until you stopped it some time after that— 
quite awhile after that? 
MS. BEARNSON: Well, again, your Honor, this is 
leading. 
THE COURT: Well, let me get down to the nub of 
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would be the answer, wouldn't it? 
BEARNSON: It would certainly be the best 
COURT: Let's find out. 
GARCIA: Ask that the tape be played then. 
COURT: Have you listened to it, Mr. Garcia? 
GARCIA: Yes. I have. And I made notes of it 
COURT: Did you make a note of where that 
made? 
GARCIA: I could find it very easily. I made 
notes of everything that was said and I could get to that 
spot in just a couple of seconds. 
THE COURT: Any objections to admitting the tape 
as the evidence of the conversation? 
MS. BEARNSON: No, your Honor. Would ask that the 
tape be played in its entirety. 
THE 
listen to the 
COURT: Well, I don't want to sit here and 
entire part of it. It's only part of it 
that's in.'issue here. Why shouldn't we just hear that part? 
MS. BEARNSON: That would be fine, your Honor, so 
long as that part is heard in its context. 
THE 
play? I have 
THE 
COURT: Sure. Have you got it here so we can 
a recorder. . 
WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
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1 I THE COURT: All right, Mr. Garcia. Let's get down 
2 I to earth on here, no use going all the way around the 
3 mulberry bush on this. 
4 MR. GARCIA: I can certainly find it. 
5 THE COURT: Take a minute for recess and let both 
6 of you get together and find where it is and listen to this 
7 tape. 
8 (Whereupon, the recess was taken.) 
9 MR. GARCIA: Sorry I wasn't better prepared for 
10 that, your Honor. But we found the point in question. 
11 Q (By Mr. Garcia) Officer, would you play that 
12 part? 
13 (Whereupon, the officer turned the tape recording 
14 on, and it started out with a statement, "This is a lie. 
15 I'm calling an attorney." Et cetera. Et cetera.) 
16 MR. GARCIA: Your Honor, it's obvious at that 
'7 point, Mr. Griffin— 
'8 THE COURT: Before we get to that, any further 
19 evidence? 
20 MR. GARCIA: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: Had he been given his Miranda rights? 
22 MR. GARCIA: He had been right before this 
23 beginning, yes. 
24 THE COURT: Any further evidence? 
25 Q (By Mr. Garcia) Officer, this conversation then 
oooi&s 
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J u l y 22, 1987 
Mr* Timothy Shea 
Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: State v. Griffin 
Appeal No. 870108-CA 
Dear Mr* Shea: 
Enclosed is Appellant's Motion to Modify the Record in the 
above case. As we discussed on the telphone on July 20, 1987, the 
court reporter in the trial court did not take down or transcribe a 
tape which was played into evidence at the motion to suppress 
hearing and relied upon by the trial court in making its ruling. 
Our office obtained a copy of the tape from the detective who 
recorded it and transcribed the appropriate portion. The transcript 
is attached to our motion as Exhibit "A". 
A representative from the Attorney General's office has 
reviewed the tape and transcript, and that office has stipulated to 
including the transcript in the record on appeal. I am also 
requesting that the tape itself be placed into evidence in the event 
the Court would like to listen to the relevant portions. The 
Attorney General's office has also stipulated to the inclusion of 
the tape in the record. 
Mr. Timothy Shea 
Page Two 
July 22, 1987 
My understanding is that the motion and stipulation from 
opposing counsel are all that is necessary to insure the inclusion 
of the transcript of the tape in the record on appeal. If there is 
anything further which we must do, please let me know as soon as 
possible. Our brief in this case is due next Monday, July 27, 1987 
and we anticipate that we will file the brief at that time without 
requesting further extensions unless we encounter some difficulty in 
including this transcript in the record. 
Please call me if you have any questions. 
Very truly yours, 
Joan C. Watt 
Appellate Attorney 
JCW/kj 
Enc. 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
STEVEN L. GRIFFIN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
PROPOSED MODIFICATION 
OF RECORD 
Case No. 870108-CA 
Pursuant to the attached Motion to Modify Record on Appeal, 
Appellant proposes the following modification of the record. 
1. The tape recording attached hereto, a portion of which 
was played into evidence at the motion to suppress hearing held on 
May 23, 1986 be admitted into evidence as part of the record. 
2. The transcript of such tape, beginning at the line 
"This is a lie. I am calling an attorney." as set forth in Exhibit 
A, attached hereto and incorporated by this reference thereto, 
supplement the record at page R. 166. 
STIPULATION 
I have read the foregoing Motion to Modify Record and 
Proposed Modification of Record and hereby stipulate to including 
such-tape and transcription in the record. 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Delivered/Mailed a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this M day of July, 1987. 
ADDENDUM D 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : APPELLANT'S MOTION TO 
MODIFY RECORD ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
STEVEN L. GRIFFIN/ : Case No. 870108-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Pursuant to Rule 11(h) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, appellant/ Steven L. Griffin, by and through counsel, JOAN 
C. WATT and MANNY GARCIA/ moves the court to supplement the record 
in the above-captioned case to include the evidence omitted from the 
transcript as set forth in the proposed modification of record 
attached hereto and, if necessary, order that a supplemental record 
be certified and transmitted. This motion is made on the following 
grounds: 
1. At the Motion to Suppress hearing held in the trial 
court May 23, 1986/ Defendant/Appellant played a tape recording into 
evidence. The court considered such tape in reaching its decision. 
2. The court reporter in the trial court did not 
transcribe the recording as part of the record. In addition, the 
court reporter informed counsel for appellant that he did not take 
notes on such tape and was therefore-unable to transcribe such tape. 
3. Counsel for appellant obtained a copy of such tape from 
Detective Strong, the Detective who made such recording. The 
attached proposed modification is a transcription of such tape, 
beginning with portion indicated on page R. 166 of the record in the 
above-captioned case. 
4. The transcript of such recording is material to the 
Appellant's argument on appeal. 
DATED this CI day of July, 1987. 
^dM.^P .u£b/ 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Appellant 
z. 
MANNY GARCIA 
Attorney for Appellant 
Delivered/Mailed a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
t h i s
 r% 1 day of July, 1987. 
